First, however, it is worth stressing the manifestações' absolute inseparability from football. Over the past year, Brazil has anticipated being in the global spotlight.
The Confederations Cup held in June was the country's dress rehearsal for the Football World Cup that Brazil will host next year. As has been well reported, preparations for the event were far from straightforward. Out of the six planned stadiums only two were delivered within FIFA's scheduled timetable, and likewise transportation and infrastructure projects were beset by a number of problems.
Nonetheless, by the start of the Confederations Cup stadiums were renovated, hotels primed, and restaurants and bars across the country expectant. In an impressive turnaround, Brazil seemed prepared for the world's gaze, and moreover, ready to assert itself on the global stage.
Come kick-off on 15 June, however, Brazil held the world's gaze for very different reasons; the manifestações were in full swing. Initially organized by the Movimento Passe Livre (MPL), the Free Fare Movement, protests began as opposition to a 7% increase in public transportation costs.
1 Metro fares in São Paulo, for instance, rose from $R3.00 to $R3.20, a significant increase for the city's minimum wage earners who on average spend one fifth of their salaries on public transport.
Thousands of Paulistas took to the streets demanding zero-fare transport at a time when conspicuous spending on the Confederations Cup was evident to so many. The
Confederations Cup catalyzed the protests, just as it provided the perfect global stage for the manifestações. To stress that São Paulo is no stranger to public protest is to underscore a key fact: while inequality is a salient characteristic of Brazilian cities, as Teresa Caldeira remarks, 'in the past decades both the marks and the meanings of inequality and the relationships and spaces in which they are manifested and reproduced have changed considerably ' (2012: 385) . In fact, one could now tentatively suggest that São Paulo (along with other Brazilian cities) has become something of a democratic space in so far as manifestações are quite normal, that people, largely the poor and marginalized, routinely assert their presence and voice through such performative articulations. This urban presencing, what Saskia Sassen has referred to as 'urban capabilities' (2012), not only offers marginalized groups new forms of visibility, 'it also expresses new forms of political agency, expanding the openness of the city's democratic public sphere' (Caldeira 2012: 385) .
All this is relatively normal in the only country in the world that, since 2001, has constitutionally guaranteed the 'right to the city'. A term first coined by Henri Lefebvre (1996, pp.63-184) , the 'right to the city' is an abstract formulation denoting an imperative for the city's marginalized to become part of its production, and for urban development to meet basic social needs before serving in the interest of capital accumulation. In Brazil, however, this urban theoretical abstraction has been putatively grounded by an alliance of social movements, squatters, NGOs and academics that ensured it was enshrined in the 2001 City Statute of Brazil's constitution -a statute emphasizing democratic urban management, the city's 'social' function as a priority for urban development, and the well being of urban inhabitants.
As utopian as this sounds, this constitutional protection of the 'right to the city' emerged from the strange collision of neoliberalism and democratization that has been key to Brazilian developmentalism since the 1990s (Harvey 2012: xiv) .
The expansion of political expression through Brazilian urban space took root much earlier, however, in the late 70s and early 80s, when social movements in São
Paulo and beyond brought residents from the peripheries into the political arena. Their appearance followed the 'opening up' of political debate in Brazil, where after the 1964 military takeover, citizen groups disappeared. The process of abertura began in 1977 and mobilized diverse sectors of the population, including women's groups and trade unions, to make their demands heard and generate spaces for oppositional movements. This new left became active in recreating a civil society, advocating for anti-authoritarianism and expanding the terrain of politics by calling for discussions of the links between everyday life and institutionalized power. Their mobilizations took to city squares, their claims for rights were incorporated in the constitution, and their ways of organizing became central to insurgent forms of citizenship that enabled a transition towards Brazil's modern political landscape (Holston 2008) . Social movements also provoked qualitative changes to urban space, forcing the expansion of infrastructures and public services. It was during these years that 'democracy took root' (Caldeira 2012: 387) . In the past decade, democracy has continued to penetrate deeply into Brazilian society, evolving way beyond the predictable realms of elections and party politics. Indeed, São Paulo's frequent manifestações signal forms of political expression that routinely use urban space for creative democratic articulation.
These days, the streets of São Paulo are the stage for varied forms of popular participation. The metropolis is home to politically inflected graffiti and taggingpixacões (figure 2). It is also striated by skateboarding and parkoor, rap and breakdancing. Since the 1990s, these practices have embedded themselves in the urban landscape, marking it, re-signifying it and taking it over. 2 These urban mobilizations, and the subtle forms of political expression in Brazil they signal, challenge long held stereotypical views of the population's passivity and the country's spirit of 'cordiality' that position conflicts in public space as anathema to national identity. They also force us to reevaluate ideas of Brazil's undemocracy, which have described universal notions such as citizenship and the public sphere as 'limited and contingent,' a legacy of patron-clientelism from the colonial period (Hanchard 1994 ).
[ Figure 2 about here]
Despite the ubiquity of urban political expression, as Caldeira (2012) 
Violence, Escalation and Emergent Class Concerns
In the early stages of the manifestações, the MPL's demands were dismissed and their protests largely condemned. Politicians denounced the demonstrations, with Geraldo While the manifestações began with specific aims -to reduce the fare increase -as they grew, they took on more diffuse demands that transcended class boundaries;
as demonstrators sang, 'Não é só vinte centavos.' They turned into protests about a range of issues: the military police's brutality, the impunity and privilege of politicians, the state's neglect of the peoples' needs and poor levels of public service.
Demonstrations were also catalysed by a more specific anger at political corruption and the perceived failure of democracy in Brazil. Protestors denounced the legislation known as PEC37 that would limit the power of federal prosecutors to investigate crimes. Many feared the laws would hinder attempts to jail corrupt politicians. In spite of these specters from the right, and in spite of the protests' apparent political incoherency, the manifestações should not be dismissed, or mistaken as a sign of mass political illiteracy and naïve idealism. Neither is it the case that the organized left has been absent from the protests, the presence of trade unions and left wing groups testifies otherwise. As Szaniecki (2013) What, then, of the government's response? President Dilma Rousseff's expression of pride at the demonstrations, which she said testified to 'the energy of our democracy, the strength of the voice of the streets and the civility of our population,' 4 can perhaps be read as the PT's attempt to rise to the political challenges posed by the manifestações, whilst also coopting them into a historical narrative of change through urban protest to which the PT itself is integral. More concretely Dilma responded to protestors' demands for change proposing a series of measures.
After meeting with organizers, she encouraged local governments to reverse the increase in transport, which has now happened in Rio, São Paulo and other cities. She also promised tighter penalties for corruption through a new law that would classify it as a more serious crime, a R$50bn (£15bn) program for public transport, new measures on health and job creation and a new Public Transport Council that would work with civil society to expand and strengthen urban mobility projects. In addition, she proposed a referendum on political reform. Legislators also dropped the controversial PEC37 Bill to which protestors were so opposed.
All this would suggest that the manifestações have been successful in achieving concrete changes, however it would be premature to celebrate the protests as such. On 9 July, Dilma's call for a plebiscite on political reform was rejected in
Congress on the grounds that it was unfeasible. Following disagreements between PT legislators and other groups allied to the federal administration, the leader of the House of Representatives, Henrique Eduardo Alves, instead suggested a commission of politicians to discuss the proposal. As Márcio Falcão observes, this excludes the people from the consultation process, ignoring calls for dialogue that have been key to the manifestações (2013). In July, the Senate also announced cuts to health and education that had previously been ring-fenced and subsidized by oil revenues. All [ Figure 3 about here]
The 'Brazil as an emerging economy' narrative is not incidental here either.
Despite the lack of single-issue politics, what is being expressed is the people's sense that they are not benefiting economically and developmentally while the nationstate's international profile skyrockets and the elites' pockets get fuller and fatter.
Emerging economy for whom? The uneven development that is the result of Brazil's embrace of neoliberalism is painfully obvious now, as the country bends over backwards to comply with FIFA's binding covenants, often to devastating effect. For example, the next stage of Maracanã's transformation for the World Cup will involve the destruction of a monument to Brazil's indigenous groups, the demolition of a thriving school and the removal of its adjacent swimming baths, both of which serve the local community, all to make way for a fit-for-FIFA multiplex with maximal retail space from which to propagate as much profit, most of which will be siphoned out of the country by FIFA's multi-national corporate partners.
More devastating still is the destruction of poor neighborhoods and favelas as part of the process to make cities more palatable for World Cup crowds. Rio's Favela do Metrô, for instance, located just 500 meters from the Maracanã stadium, was leveled in 2010 and its families transferred to public housing estates in the peripheries. This is not an isolated case. In the past four years, Mayor Eduardo Paes has evicted 19,000 families from 192 slums around the city (Brisolla 2013) . Those who have not been forcibly displaced from their homes have been driven away by the rising costs of services (Szaniecki 2013) . These urban displacements only enhance the relevance of the 20-cent rise in public transportation costs for those whose commutes have been significantly lengthened as a direct result. Thus despite chants of 'Não é só vinte centavos', for many 20-cents remains a real issue, and perhaps as a result, an issue that transcends class.
All of this testifies to just how Brazil's development as an emerging economy has been built on an embrace of neoliberalism and all the social and spatial consequences that entails. As the country has made great efforts to become a global power, it has seemingly turned its back on social policies adopted by PT. These policies, which led to a significant reduction in poverty, the emergence of a new middle class, the acknowledgment of discrimination against indigenous populations as well as people of African descent, and a growing recognition of indigenous land rights and quilombolas, have been replaced with an emphasis on internationalism and an active role in the growing prominence of the emerging economies of the BRICS.
Boaventura de Sousa Santos writes that 'policies aimed at social inclusion dried up, no longer meeting the expectations of those who felt they deserved more. The quality of urban life deteriorated as precedence was given to internationally prestigious events that ended up absorbing investments that were supposed to improve education, transportation and public services in general ' (2013) .
That the manifestações grew to articulate mass grievance about a range of issues united only by discontent at the state's neglect of social policies and peoples'
basic needs, signals a familiar story about underdevelopment. Public transport, health, education, community leisure facilities, and even indigenous heritage, are commons resources that the state is turning its back on as it pursues its economic development.
Whether this constitutes what David Harvey (2003) has referred to as 'accumulation by dispossession' hinges on whether the state has turned those commons resources into profitable use or not. But this is perhaps a less germane question than whether the state should do more to ensure it provides universal access to these commons, especially given its constitutional commitment to the right to the city? It is the street that seems to be posing the question. 
What is happening in

